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Abstract
This Note argues that the British decision in In re an Inquiry Under the Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (Warner) has impaired British investigatory efforts in securities fraud
cases and hampered future American requests for information under the MOU. Part I of this Note
discusses the MOU and the events attending its passage. Part II analyzes the Warner decision
and discusses relevant British and American regulatory procedures. Part III examines the MOU’s
flaws and presents an alternative that would assure the obligation of both British and American
Authorities to investigate and to comply with the MOU.
NOTES
THE BRITISH-U.S. MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING OF 1986: IMPLICATIONS
AFTER WARNER
INTRODUCTION
In September 1986, British and American securities regu-
latory agencies (the "Authorities") signed an interim agree-
ment known as the Memorandum of Understanding'
("MOU"). The MOU grants an Authority access to its foreign
counterpart's information on an investor or to information the
requested party could obtain through its "best efforts."' 2 On
March 31, 1987, a British High Court ruled that a London
journalist was not obligated to divulge to government inspec-
tors the sources of his two accurate predictions as to the gov-
ernment's disposition of reviewed takeover bids.3 This deci-
sion undermines the effectiveness of the MOU by decreasing
the amount of information the British regulatory agency can
gather through its "best efforts" and share with U.S. agencies.
This Note argues that the British decision in In re an In-
quiry Under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985'
(Warner) has impaired British investigatory efforts in securities
fraud cases and hampered future American requests for infor-
mation under the MOU. In addition, the MOU is further weak-
ened by its reliance on vague terms and its failure to include a
provision that compels the compliance of its signatories. Part I
of this Note discusses the MOU and the events attending its
passage. Part II analyzes the W'Varner decision and discusses rel-
evant British and American regulatory procedures. Part III ex-
amines the MOU's flaws and presents an alternative that would
1. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
SEC, CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters
Relating to Securities and Futures [hereinafter MOU], [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027 (Sept. 23,1986).
2. Id. para. 4, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at
88,245; see infra note 7.
3. In re an Inquiry Under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985,
slip op. (Ch. Mar. 31, 1987) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) [hereinafter High
Court Decision].
4. Id.
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assure the obligation of both British and American Authorities
to investigate and to comply with the MOU.
I. THE MOU: THE CALM AFTER THE STORM
The MOU was enacted amidst heightened international
activity in securities purchases, the unpredictablilty of U.S. ju-
dicial decisions regarding foreign compliance with requests for
information, and foreign hostility to U.S. investigatory efforts
in the form of blocking statutes and bank secrecy laws. Signed
by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion"), America's Commodities Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC"), and Britain's Department of Trade and Industry
("DTI"), the MOU purports to "facilitate the exchange of in-
formation regarding the enforcement of United States and
United Kingdom securities and commodities laws." 5 Recog-
nizing the need for mutual cooperation between relevant na-
tional authorities,6 it provides for international investigatory
efforts through the sharing of information that an agency has
"in its hands or that it can by its best efforts obtain."7
A. Provisions of the MOU
The MOU provides that requests by the Authorities for
information must meet specific criteria. The information re-
quested must be related to the prevention of insider trading,8
fraudulent security dealing, or market manipulation. 9 A re-
quest is deemed relevant by the requested party regarding a
futures transaction' ° when the underlying contract is signed
5. MOU, supra note 1, CCH headnote, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,244. One famous story relates how the DTI once refused
a simple SEC request for a phone number. Editorial, Hands Across the Water, Busi-
NESS, Feb. 1987, at 11.
6. MOU, supra note 1, para. 5, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,027, at 88,245.
7. Id. para. 4, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84.027, at
88,245. Nothing within the MOU defines the term "best efforts."
8. Id. para. l(h)(i)(A), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,244-45. The British and the MOU refer to "insider trading" as "insider
dealing." See Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8.
9. MOU, supra note 1, para. l(h)(i)(A), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,244-45.
10. Futures are exchange traded contracts that specify a future date of delivery
or receipt of a certain amount of a specific tangible or intangible product. Futures
are used by business as a hedge against unfavorable price changes and by speculators
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within its territory, and, regarding a securities transaction,
when any material part is effected there." Moreover, the
MOU dictates the form of the requests for information' 2 and
describes sundry situations in which a request may be re-
fused.' 3  The request must specify the purpose for which the
information is sought, 14 the behavior that has caused con-
cern,' 5 and the identity of the person under suspicion.' 6
Requests may be refused when they relate to information
held by the DTI in its non-securities investigatory capacity.' 7
Additionally, either Authority may refuse to comply on the
grounds of "public interest,""' which is to be determined by
the British Secretary of State when the DTI is the requested
party.' 9 Conversely, when the DTI requests information, the
SEC or the CFTC decides after consulting with relevant U.S.
government officials whether "public interest" warrants a re-
fusal to comply.20
While requests "otherwise than under this Memorandum
but for a purpose within its scope ' 2' are allowed, they are to
who hope to profit from such changes. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GLOSSARY 12
(1986).
11. MOU, supra note 1, para. 1(h)(ii)(A), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,244-45.
12. Id. para. 7(a), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,245. If the request is oral, it must be reduced to writing within ten
days. Id. The form for written requests is also delineated in the MOU. See id. para. 7,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed, Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,245-46.
13. Id. paras. 5-6, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,245. For example, the DTI may refuse to share information it holds
"solely by ... powers that relate to matters other than securities, investments, fu-
tures, or company law." Id para. 6, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,027, at 88,245.
14. Id. para. 7(b)(ii), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,245.
15. Id. para. 7(b)(iii), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,245.
16. Id. para. 7(b)(iv), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,245-46.
17. Id. para. 6, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 84,027,
at 88,245.
18. Id. para. 5, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027,
at 88,245. Nothing within the MOU defines "public interest."
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. para. 12, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027,
at 88,247. The "scope" of the MOU is briefly referred to in its introductory para-
graph. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
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be conducted with "moderation and restraint, ' '1 2 preceded by
a formal request under the MOU,2 3 and followed by consulta-
tions by all relevant Authorities on the matter.2 4
Finally, the MOU is expressly an interim understanding2 5
that is to terminate upon the signing of a bilateral treaty be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K. governing mutual cooperation in
this area. The Authorities are similarly encouraged to use
their best efforts to enter into formal negotiations by Septem-
ber 1987.26
B. Background of the MOU
In the early 1980s, the SEC and brokerage firms under its
aegis began to fear the rapid, unregulated globalization of se-
curities markets. 27  In particular, American firms were con-
cerned about the impending British deregulation of the
London Stock Exchange.2 8 Prior to the MOU's adoption, se-
curities regulators who hoped to compel the production of evi-
dence or testimony from abroad had to rely upon far-reaching
and tenuously-based court orders.29
22. MOU, supra note 1, para 12(a), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,247.
23. Id. para. 12(b)(i), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,247.
24. Id. para. 12(c), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,247.
-25. Id. para. 17, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,027,
at 88,247.
26. Id. This is not to be confused with "best efforts," supra note 7.
27. See Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the
World Securities Market, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,759 (Apr. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Release No.
21,958] (expressing SEC fears of rapid internationalization of the securities markets);
Putka, Insider Trading Raises Fewer Hackles Abroad, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 36, col.
1.
28. See Letter from Samuel E. Hunter, Senior Vice President of Merrill Lynch
Securities Trading Division, to John Wheeler, Secretary of Securities and Exchange
Commission (Sept. 30, 1985) (discussing Release No. 21,958, supra note 27).
29. See, e.g., Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commer-
ciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34
required foreign petitioner to produce foreign documents); Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 grants subject matter
jurisdiction when a foreign security is registered and traded in the U.S.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (SEC may subpoena
documents and witnesses outside of the United States if service is properly effected
within the U.S.).
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Utilizing a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("SEA"), the SEC has often brought suit to compel dis-
closure by a witness/defendant."0 Section 21 of the SEA al-
lows the SEC to bring suit in the appropriate federal district
court to compel compliance with an SEC subpoena and an in-
vestigation."' United States courts have usually invoked a bal-
ancing test when ruling on the Commission's claim ofjurisdic-
tion over subject matter and the foreign witness or defend-
ant. 32 The factors weighed in this approach include, but are
not limited to: the national interests of the nations involved,
the hardships that enforcement would impose upon the par-
ties, and the expected extent of compliance with the compelled
disclosure. 33
Although the SEC contends that its principal problem in
international regulation remains the gathering of evidence not
directly subject to U.S. jurisdiction, 4 U.S. courts have com-
pelled production on numerous occasions.33 In order to pro-
30. Section 21 of-the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u
(1982), provides in relevant part as follows:
(c) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpena [sic] issued to,
any person, the Commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United
States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is
carried on, or where such person resides or carries on business, in requiring
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, pa-
pers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records. And such court may
issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission or
member or officer designated by the Commission, there to produce records,
if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation
or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be pun-
ished by such court as a contempt thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982). For application of this section see SEC v. OKC Corp., 474
F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The trend has been to permit inquiries if they are
within the authority of the agency, not too indefinite, and "reasonably relevant."
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1071 (1979) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
32. Larose, Conflicts, Contacts, and Cooperation: Extraterritorial Application of the
United States Securities Laws, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 123-24 (1984).
33. Id. at 124.
34. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the House Com-
mittee on the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, SEC Interim Report,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,037, at 88,299 (Oct. 9,
1986).
35. See supra note 29.
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tect U.S. investors,3 6 federal courts have found that they pos-
sessed subject matter jurisdiction even when the harmful con-
duct occurred entirely outside of the United States3 7 and when
the transactions were executed in the United States but ema-
nated from abroad.3 8
Similarly, U.S. courts have asserted personal jurisdiction
over the witness/defendant despite the cautionary language of
the Restatement Second of Foreign Relations Law,3 9 which en-
courages judicial restraint when a foreign party is subpoe-
naed.40 For example, U.S. courts have ruled that a foreign
bank must disclose the identity of customers alleged to have
violated U.S. securities laws4 and that a foreign citizen must
waive native bank secrecy law protection when he is a named
defendant in an insider trading suit.42 Moreover, in criminal
investigations, U.S. courts have proven to be even more likely
to compel both waivers of native protections43 and production
of testimony or records.44
36. For a recent reiteration, see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-59 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (SEA grants subject
matter jurisdiction when a foreign security is registered and traded in the United
States), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
38. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984)
(court found subject matter jurisdiction over foreign-emanating commodities trans-
actions because of their artificial influence on public markets), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
871 (1984).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 40 (1965).
40. Id. The Restatement provides that both states must consider certain moder-
ating factors when they exercise jusrisdiction in an area where conflicts may arise.
Those factors are similar to the ones described at text accompanying supra note 33.
41. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(bank forced to disclose information on an Italian securities professional subse-
quently found to have violated § 10(b) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and
Rule lOb-5).
42. See SEC v. Musella, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,800 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1984) (court rejected defendant's assertion in pretrial mo-
tion of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in allowing SEC to
draw an adverse factual inference from defendant's refusal to waive Swiss bank se-
crecy and to answer a deposition).
43. See United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enforcement of summons to produce banking records of American
taxpayers upheld despite Hong Kong's bank secrecy law because of law's inclusion of
exceptions).
44. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 691
F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (subpoena calling for
production of bank records upheld despite fact that compliance would violate Baha-
mian bank secrecy rule).
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Reliance on U.S. court orders compelling foreign disclo-
sure, however, is considered offensive by foreign nations and
unreliable by U.S. agencies. For example, in the wake of such
assertive U.S. court action, the British have amended a recent
national act to allow for the prevention of compliance. 45 Fur-
thermore, there are almost as many U.S. court decisions refus-
ing to find the foreign individual or foreign entity subject to
U.S. jurisdiction as there are those that do.4 6 To address these
problems, the SEC developed the "waiver by conduct" the-
ory.4 7 Based on the presumption that a purchase through an
American exchange constitutes a forfeiture of foreign protec-
tions, this theory has yet to be formally adopted by the Com-
mission.4 s
The MOU attempts to eliminate such antagonizing means
and unpredictable ends. By encouraging formal requests, the
MOU discourages the immediate seeking of court-ordered dis-
closure. By establishing a framework under which these re-
quests must operate, the MOU puts the relevant agencies on
45. For example, section 177(8) of the Financial Services Act 1986, c 60, creates
banking secrecy in Britain. See Mann & Sullivan, Current Issues in International Securities
Law Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS AND COMPANIES at 506.
46. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987)
(decision to exercise jurisdiction over a third party defendant must comport with
"fair play and substantial justice"); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir.) (court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction where transactions are "predomi-
nantly foreign"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) with Societe Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)
(Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 required foreign petitioner to produce foreign
documents); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 grants subject matter jurisdiction when a foreign security is registered
and traded in the U.S.), rev'don other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th
Cir. 1945) (SEC may subpoena documents and witnesses outside of United States if
service is properly effected within the U.S.).
47. Text of Conference on International Trading in Securities, sponsored by the
New York Stock Exchange and the Boston University School of Law (hereinafter In-
ternational Trading Conference), New York, N.Y. (Oct. 18, 1985). John M. Fedders,
the Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, wrote to the Congress on March
30, 1984, exposing the problem of investigating those who purchase securities
through American markets from abroad. Fedder suggested that the Congress draft a
bill stating that such a purchase would imply a "waiver by conduct" of foreign secrecy
laws; subsequently Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.) suggested that the SEC it-
self formally adopt this position. The "waiver by conduct" theory was thus opened
for consideration on May 31, 1984. Id. at 65.
48. Id. at 72.
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notice of potential requests and precludes the refusal of re-
quests for reasons of ambiguity or unilaterally-defined irrele-
vance.
Thus, the "exchange-of-files" approach embodied in the
MOU allays fears. The SEC applauded the signing of the
MOU and looked forward to "enhance[d] cooperation" and
mutual assistance.49 The Commission saw the agreement as
being flexible enough to make assistance available in cases in-
volving "insider trading, market manipulation and misrepre-
sentations relating to market transactions, as well as in the
oversight of investment businesses and brokerage firms."150
The SEC Enforcement Director extolled the cooperative
agreement as a vast improvement over the "informal arrange-
ment" that preceded it.51 Similarly, he stated that the next
such U.S.-U.K. agreement, with Congressional approval, might
extend the Commission's reach into the files of a broker-
dealer.52 United Kingdom officials noted that the MOU was
negotiated in only six months.53
II. THE WARNER DECISION
The British High Court's decision in Warner, which upheld
the right of a financial journalist to withhold his sources, in one
fell swoop reduces the amount and types of information the
DTI can obtain through its "best efforts."54 Justice Hoffman
ruled that government-appointed inspectors attempting to ex-
pose a £10,000,000 insider trading ring55 believed to include
at least one Crown servant 56 had not proven that the need for
Warner's disclosure outweighed a statutorily defined re-
porter's privilege.
Until August 1986, Jeremy Warner worked as a reporter
49. See U.S., U.K. Sign Agreement to Share Securities, Commodities Information, 18 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1397 (Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter U.S., U.K. Sign].
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51. U.S., U.K. Sign, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lindsay v. Warner, slip op. (C.A. May 6, 1987) (LEXIS, Enggen library,
Cases file).
55. High Court Decision, supra note 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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for The Times of London. 8 On November 7, 1985, the paper
published an article written by another securities journalist
that predicted that the British government's Monopolies and
Mergers Commission would allow a takeover bid for the Mat-
thew Brown brewery company that week, subject to certain
conditions.59 The next day Warner's column stated, with inor-
dinate certainty, that no such conditions would be required. °
Warner was subsequently proven right.
6
'
In August 1986, Warner moved on to become the busi-
ness correspondent for The Independent, another London publi-
62Hiarilcation. His article of October 23, 1986 predicted that Strong
& Fischer's bid for Garnar Booth, a fellow tanning company,
would be forced to undergo review before the same commis-
sion at the request of the Secretary of State. It eventually
did.63
Subsequently, the divining journalist was asked to appear
before a group of government inspectors, who had been ap-
pointed by the DTI in December 1986 pursuant to the Finan-
cial Services Act of the same year.' The group had been
charged with the responsibility of uncovering possible insider
trading in the United Kingdom.65 Asserting a general re-
porter's privilege to withhold the names of his sources, Warner
refused to answer questions relating to either the nature or
sources of his accurate predictions.
The inspectors then filed suit to compel Warner to dis-
close.6 7 Without alleging that the reporter had personally
benefitted from any suspected government employee's "leaks"
of information, the inspectors argued that Warner's silence,
while out of court, was maintained under oath and was part of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Warner, supra note 54.
64. Id. Section 177(1) of the Financial Services Act 1986 gives the Secretary of
State the power to appoint inspectors "to carry out such investigations as are requi-
site to establish whether or not any contravention [of the insider trading law] has
occurred and to report the results of their investigations to him." Financial Services
Act 1986, ch. 60, § 177(1).
65. Id.
66. High Court Decision, supra note 3.
67. Id
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an examination. 68 He was, thus, subject to sanctions despite
the section 10 reporter's privilege of the 1981 Contempt of
Court Act. 69
In finding for the reporter, Justice Hoffman's decision first
focused on a balancing test that weighed the interest in safe-
guarding society from wrongdoers against the need for a re-
porter's privilege from disclosure. 70 Noting that lawyers often
believe crime prevention to be paramount to "the preservation
of a general principle [reporter's privilege],' the justice
nonetheless emphasized the need for a reporter's sources to
feel confident that their identities will not be disclosed. 72 Jus-
tice Hoffman then ruled that the exception to the privilege
listed in Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act was not rele-
vant, but, if applicable, should be construed strictly. 73 The in-
spectors having failed to prove that Warner's testimony was
"necessary" to prevent further insider dealing, his statutory
privilege nonetheless would remain intact.74
Justice Hoffman never decided whether an out-of-court re-
fusal to testify can be equated with an in-court refusal that war-
rants a finding of contempt. Much weight was accorded the
inspectors' statement that they already knew the existence and
name of one "leaking" Crown servant but could possibly learn
the identities of suspected and vital others through Warner's
68. Id.
69. Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provided in relevant part:
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of con-
tempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained
in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the
satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests ofjustice
or national security orfor the prevention of disorder or crime.
Contempt of Court Act 1981, ch. 49, § 10 (emphasis added).
70. High Court Decision, supra note 3.
71. The full quote in pertinent part reads:
The weighing process is difficult because on the one hand one is concerned
with an immediate and practical question, the detection or prevention of
specific crimes, and on the other hand, the preservation of a general princi-
ple. It is tempting for lawyers to think common sense requires [that] para-
mount importance to be given to the former. But this is not necessarily so
... a balance has to be kept.
Id.; see also supra note 69.
72. High Court Decision, supra note 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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testimony.7 5 Justice Hoffman pointed out that, since the in-
spectors already had a name, Warner's testimony was all the
less important. 76 The Justice also ignored the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that Warner would be one of the few disinterested wit-
nesses in the case."
After losing this initial battle, the inspectors sought leave
to appeal to the House of Lords, which was granted in a unani-
mous written opinion of the Civil Division Court of Appeals on
May 6, 1987.78 Thejustices were impressed by the certainty of
Warner's predictions as well as the Contempt of Court Act's
specific instructions granting a court the power to punish a re-
calcitrant witness "as if he had been guilty of contempt of the
court."179 Adding that the "clergyman, banker or the medical
man" may not refuse to disclose when directed by a judge who
has determined that the consequence is a crime,80 the justices
granted the appeal with the hope that the House of Lords
would find for the inspectors.8 '
The decision illustrates the ability of a British judge on
any level to hamstring an investigation at a time when British
securities regulators have been criticized both at home and
abroad82 for their leniency. Warner also exemplifies the elabo-
rate and piecemeal statutory procedure currently governing
British investigations into securities frauds. In this area the
British regulatory framework is novel and relatively untested
because British securities statutes are continually undergoing
sweeping revision.8 3 Conversely, the American system is
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Warner, supra note 54.
79. Id.; see Financial Services Act 1986 ch. 60, § 178(2)(a).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Forman, Lenient Penalty in Insider Trading Case Threatens U.K Crackdown 's Credi-
bility, Wall St.J.,July 6, 1987, at 8, col. 4; Deterring the Insider Dealers, The Independent
(London),July 3, 1987, at 18, col. 1. The Journal took issue with the recent refusal by
a British court to incarcerate a convicted insider trader while Britain's own Independent
criticized U.K. regulatory efforts as severely "lagging" behind those of the New York
Stock Exchange. Deterring the Insider Dealers, supra, at 18, col. 1; Forman, supra, at 8,
col. 4.
83. For example, the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8, sup-
planted the Companies Act 1981, ch. 62, regarding securities frauds, and the 1986
Financial Services. Act, ch. 60, elaborated on these violations. See Financial Services
Act 1986, ch. 60, §§ 177-178. Regarding the 1986 Act, it has been stated that:
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grounded in relatively stable statutes passed over fifty years
ago.8 4
For example, in the chain of events that led to the Warner
case, no fewer than four recent British statutes and their proce-
dural requirements were invoked. The inspectors were ap-
pointed under Section 177(1) of the 1986 Financial Services
Act8 5 after a finding by the Secretary of State that there were
"circumstances suggesting that there may have been a contra-
vention of section 2 of the 1985 [Insider Dealing] Act."86 Sec-
tion 177(4) of the 1986 Act8 7 empowered the inspectors to ex-
amine Warner under oath, but the Contempt of Court Act of
198188 was suggested by the inspectors as a basis for suit once
Warner refused to comply.
The goal of the inspectors was to punish the Crown ser-
vants believed to have "leaked" unpublished "price-sensitive"
information.8 9 While the definition of "price sensitive" has
The apparently modest initial proposals of the Government have, however,
produced a large, unwieldly, and technical piece of legislation, the subject of
over one thousand parliamentary amendments and many late night debates.
The Act has emerged 211 sections long and so complex that members of
Parliament protested that no one, not even the Government members re-
sponsible for the Bill, understood its provisions and their implications.
Barnard, The United Kingdom Financial Services Act, 1986: A New Regulatoy Framework,
21 INT'L LAw. 343, 344 (1987).
84. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982 & Supp.
III 1985); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10, 21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78u (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). An exception to this history of stability would be the current contro-
versy surrounding the application of section 10b of the SEA to non-securities person-
nel accused of insider trading, as in the Winans case, United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986). The point to be made is that
when compared to Britain's ever-changing prohibitions, those of the United States
concerning market manipulation and securities fraud in general are stable.
85. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 177(1).
86. Warner, supra note 54.
87. Section 177(4) of the Financial Services Act 1986 provides in pertinent part
as follows: "An inspector may examine on oath any person who he considers is or
may be able to give information concerning any such contravention, and may admin-
ister an oath accordingly." Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60,. § 177(4).
88. Contempt of Court Act 1981, ch. 49, § 10; see supra note 69.
89. The 1980 statute defines unpublished price sensitive information as that
which
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or indirectly)
to that company, that is to say, [sic] is not of general nature relating or
of concern to that company; and
(b) is not generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would
be likely to deal in those securities but which would if it were generally
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been retained in the Insider Dealing Act of 1985,90 the descrip-
tion of parties who must abstain from trading has been ex-
panded and restructured.9' Ultimately British officials must
utilize Section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act of 198192 to
freeze the wrongfully gained assets as regulators can in the
United States.93 Such numerous procedural requirements
make it increasingly difficult to punish a British securities de-
frauder, whether the enforcing party be British or an inquiring
American agency official.
In contrast, the SEC relies upon the established regulatory
framework consisting of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, rules and regulations promulgated
under both acts, and relevant court decisions. One section of
the SEA authorizes investigations,94 allows for examination of
witnesses/defendants under oath,9 5 grants the right to seek
compelled disclosure through a district court, and empowers
this court to issue such orders. 6 Moreover, the SEC can inves-
tigate without probable cause and "merely on the suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants as-
surance that it is not. ' '9 7 The SEA also outlines those activities
that give rise to securities fraud investigations. 8
known to them be likely materially to affect the price of those securi-
ties.
Companies Act 1980, ch. 22, § 73(2)(a)-(b).
90. See Insider Dealing Act 1985, ch. 8, § 10.
91. Compare Companies Act 1980, ch. 22 § 10, §§ 68-70 with Insider Dealing Act
1985, ch. 8, §§ 1-7.
92. Supreme Court Act 1981, ch. 54, § 31.
93. For example, SEC officials can rely on the securities laws themselves in ask-
ing for a freezing of the defrauder's assets until trial. See Complaint, SEC v. Gross-
man, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,184 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987)
(No. 87 Civ. 1031 (SWK)) (petition for injunction preventing transporting of funds
allegedly gained through illegal insider trading).
94. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982).
95. Id. § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982).
96. Id. § 21(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982).
97. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
98. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
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Aside from exposing differences between the regulatory
frameworks of the United States and United Kingdom, Warner
also highlights the unfairness of the MOU's "let's swap files"
approach. The MOU provides for inequitable results. 99 A
U.S. investigator is more likely to be successful in obtaining
evidence within his nation than is his British counterpart be-
cause of the latter nation's piecemeal regulatory scheme.' 00 In
this sense, the case shows that in practice the MOU would
work primarily to the U.K.'s benefit. Ultimately, Warner hin-
ders SEC or CFTC requests relating to either a British inves-
tor's purchases through an American exchange or to an Ameri-
can investor operating from abroad. The case summarily elim-
inates financial reporters as a source of information while
decreasing the amount and types of information that the DTI
can obtain through its "best efforts," for that term is not likely
to be construed as requiring the DTI to ignore a recent court
precedent. In comparison, SEC files are much more detailed
and thorough simply because U.S. courts have allowed that
agency more freedom in pursuing an inquiry. 0 ' Therefore the
exchange of SEC files for those of the British is not equally
beneficial.
Warner effectively holds that a reporter may involve him-
self with a securities scheme in order to relate vital but gener-
ally unknown information to his public and, as long as another
potential government witness exists, not be subject to govern-
ment questioning on the subject. A class of informants vital to
securities regulation-financial journalists 2-has in effect
been judicially declared to be above and beyond questioning
by a government agency. Meanwhile the MOU is unable to
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
99. For example, a United States investor who purchases from abroad is subject
to less regulation than the investor who purchases from this ccuntry if the foreign
intermediary nation employs bank secrecy or blocking statutes. See discussion of SEC
Release No. 21,186, International Trading Conference, supra note 47, at 66.
100. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
102. The chart that lists criminal prosecutions of insider trading at the office of
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York office now includes
reporters. Janvey, Criminal Prosecution of Insider Trading. 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 136, 139
(1987).
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provide U.S. agencies access to either these reporters or an
equally effective source of information.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MOU
The internationalization of securities markets is currently
a major concern of Congress 0 and America's largest stock ex-
change.04 Additionally, while regulatory problems relating to
international transactions mount, foreign individuals and enti-
ties are expressing greater interest both in listing their securi-
ties in the U.S.' 05 and in purchasing U.S. securities.' 0 6 This
internationalization has created the opportunity for criminal
activity abroad by American investors, 0 7 which substantially
increases the regulatory problems of the SEC.
To cope with the problem of compelling production of
needed evidence and testimony in securities investigations
from abroad, American and British regulators signed the MOU
to replace a practice of seeking court orders and passing retali-
atory legislation with one of cooperation.' 0 8
The MOU, however, is only as effective as the investiga-
tory powers of each nation. If American regulators must de-
103. House Plans Summertime Securities, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, June 30,
1987, at 7, col. 1.
104. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1987 FIRST QUARTER REPORT 3.
105. Brewerton, UK Companies Line Up for Big Board Listings, The Independent
(London),June 24, 1987, at 12, col. 1; see also Foreigners Invested 131'a More in U.S. Last
Year; U.K. Led Rise, Investor's Daily, June 25, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
106. Id.; see also Sesit, An Appraisal: Japanese Analysts Find a Lot to Like in U.S.
Stocks, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 55, col. 3.
107. Last year American arbitrageur Ivan Boesky was linked to the British Guin-
ness Company scandal, which centered on that company's illegal payments to inves-
tors in return for the purchase of large blocks of stock so as to increase its bid in a
takeover offer. U.K. Launches an Investigation into Guinness, Wall St.J., Dec. 2, 1986, at
37, col. 1. This year Guinness Company reported taking a $200,000,000 charge re-
lated partly to its involvement with Boesky. Guinness Takes $200M Charge Due to Bo-
esky, Newsday, Apr. 24, 1987, at 45, col. 1. In March, the British company, the largest
investor in Boesky's limited partnership, sued him for misleading offering docu-
ments. Burrough,Judge Allows Suits Against Boesky, Others to Proceed, Wall St.J.,July 29,
1987, at 4, col. 3.
Perhaps more significant is the recent decision of Israeli businessman David
Sofer to cooperate in an international insider trading scheme involving high-ranking
former Merrill Lynch & Co. official Nahum Vaskevitch. Allegedly Vaskevitch leaked
"confidential information about numerous transactions involving Merrill Lynch cli-
ents" to the Israeli. Hertzberg, Israeli 111illAid Trading Inquiry, Sources Assert, Wall St.J.,
July 2, 1987, at 3, col.4.
108. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
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pend upon British files regarding an investor or an abettor,
they will not be able to pursue their inquiry whenever a re-
porter is involved.' ° 9 Such involvement by the press with the
securities market is not purely hypothetical. An example is the
much publicized Winans case in the United States," 0 wherein
the U.S. government prosecuted a reporter who had profited
through insider trading on prepublication "leaks" of his col-
umn's tenor and content. Britain's shielding of an involved re-
porter also undermines the spirit of the MOU by preventing
access to information that would probably be obtained and
produced by American officials. U.S. courts have refused to
immunize non-benefitting reporters when the result would be
to impede a civil"' l or criminal" 2 investigation. Thus, Warner
erects a framework under which British officials making re-
109. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
110. "Winans" is the name securities industry participants and observers have
attached to the Carpenter case. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
At the district court level of the case, Winans's "journalistic purity" defense was
declared untenable by the court. See Winans, 612 F.Supp. at 835 n.4. That defense
attempted to assert that although Winans leaked the content of his "Heard on the
Street" column prior to publication, he never compromised his professional opinions
or let any profit motive alter the tenor of his writing. Id. at 835.
More importantly, the Second Circuit held on review that a columnist has a duty
of disclosure under federal securities laws, the first amendment notwithstanding. See
791 F.2d at 1034.
111. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 909 (1982). This case held that a reporter is prevented in a civil action,
whether he is a party or not, from claiming a privilege to withhold his confidential
sources when the information is 1) highly relevant and material, 2) necessary or criti-
cal to the maintenance of the claim, and 3) not obtainable from other available
sources. 680 F.2d at 7. This test has been utilized in more than 400 reporter privi-
lege cases regarding a reporter's disclosure of confidential or non-confidential infor-
mation. Goodale, Back to the Drawing Board for New York's Shield Law, NAT'L LJ., July
27, 1987, at 13.
112. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
That decision stated:
The point to be made, however, is that among the many First Amendment
protections that may be invoked by the press, there is not to be found the
privilege of refusing to reveal relevant confidential information and its
sources to a grand jury which is engaged in the fundamental governmental
function of "[flair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security
for the person and property of the individual." The reason this is so is that
a majority of the members of the U.S. Supreme Court have so determined.
78 N.J. at 268, 394 A.2d at 334 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690
(1972)).
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quests under the MOU can receive additional and more useful
information from American regulators than the latter can from
the former.
Yet this disparity manifests but one of the MOU's numer-
ous flaws. Other inadequacies include its failure to prevent a
signatory agency from resorting to its prior practice of compel-
ling disclosure, its reliance on vague guidelines such as "with
moderation and restraint,"'" 3 and its ultimate dependence on
differing interpretations of securities and procedural laws.
A. Resort to Previous Ways
The MOU does not preclude an agency from simply "slap-
ping a subpoena" on a foreign individual or entity after a for-
mal request has been refused. 1 4 Similarly, no MOU provision
prevents either nation from passing legislation allowing it to
prevent voluntary disclosure under certain circumstances, as
Britain did in 1986."11 Two recent U.S. court decisions speak
against the efficacy and binding nature of agreements similar
to the MOU.
The Hague Convention for the Taking of Evidence,' 16 a
multinational foreign discovery treaty addressing the problems
of gathering/compelling evidence from abroad, went into ef-
fect in 1970. It was at first blatantly ignored and thereafter
protested by a French witness in an SEC-commenced fraud
case from 1983 to 1986."11 The SEC was thus forced to settle
the case in that year." 8
In addition, on June 15, 1987, the Supreme Court of the
United States further eviscerated the Hague Convention by
ruling that "federal courts have latitude in deciding whether to
require that foreign companies produce records and other evi-
dence in U.S. lawsuits." ' ' 9 The agreement relegated to a non-
113. MOU, supra note 1, para. 12(a), 11986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,247.
114. 18 SEC. REG. AND L. REP. (BNA) 1397 (Sept. 26, 1986).
115. See Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 177(8)(b).
116. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231.
117. See Mann & Sullivan, supra note 47, at 531-32.
118. Id. at 532.
119. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (holding that the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
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dispositive role here was a formal treaty, while the MOU by its
own terms is an interim agreement.12 0
B. Aoderation and Restraint
Inquiries made outside of the MOU but relating to its
scope must be made "with moderation and restraint."'' 2  This
term is open to greatly varying interpretations, and the U.S.
definition has traditionally been more expansive than those of
other nations.122 United States courts have upheld the un-
questionable right of U.S. administrative agencies to pursue
matters relevant to their supervisory roles. 23  One U.S.
Supreme Court Justice recently stated that investor protection
was the main purpose for the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 24
Moreover, at least one American exchange has itself evi-
denced a rather bold view of its foreign regulatory powers.
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 116, does not provide ex-
clusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located in
a foreign signatory's territory).
120. MOU, supra, note 1, para. 17, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,027, at 88,247.
121. Id. para. 12(a), [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,027, at 88,247.
122. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. See generally Atwood, Extrater-
ritorial Discovery in International Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 319, 324-27 n.2 (1984)
("[o]ne of the features that faces the strongest objections is the relatively broad view
American courts take of their jurisdiction over anti-trust claims").
Section 21(b)-(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 puts no such similar
constraint (i.e., "with moderation and restraint") on the SEC's investigations. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(b)-(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)-(d) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
Noteworthy is that Rule 176 of the 1933 Securities Act, which delineates the
definition of "reasonable investigation" under Section 11 of the same Act, lists eight
factors, all of which focus only on the suspect's actions, title and references. See Se-
curities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
123. See Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350 (D.
Wyo. 1983), remanded, 751 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 64 (1985)
(upholding broad authority to investigate potential wrong-doings that extends be-
yond mere scope of an agency's regulatory authority; allows agencies to seek infor-
mation from parties not ordinarily subject to an agency's jurisdiction in order to con-
duct an investigation); Citadel Trading Co. v. Bagely, 440 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D.
Mo. 1977) (mere allegation by parties being investigated of possible damage to their
business activities is not sufficient to block authorized inquiry by regulatory agency
into relevant matters).
124. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[o]ne of the principal Congressional purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act is to protect the investor in a highly sophisticated field").
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Late in the winter of 1986, the President of the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") invoked Exchange Rule 390 in an
attempt to prevent Exchange members from making markets
through the London Exchange before or after NYSE hours.' 25
The resulting uproar at home and abroad caused the Exchange
to abandon this stand. 2 6
This term was undoubtedly included in the MOU to deter
either Authority from unduly pressuring a foreign witness or
defendant and from expanding upon the other's concept ofju-
risdiction. The fact remains, however, that U.S. agencies and
those they regulate maintain a different view of what "modera-
tion and restraint" entails when securities frauds are involved
than do their foreign counterparts. 2 7
C. Differing Pronouncements on Fraud and Procedure
The United States and United Kingdom also have differ-
ing interpretations of what constitutes insider trading and are
currently moving in opposite directions in their attempts to de-
ter it. In 1981, Britain criminalized through a short, one para-
graph definition in the Company Securities Act 28 trading
upon the knowledge of unpublished price sensitive informa-
tion. In 1983 the U.S. Congress expressly rejected the concept
of a concise definition of the crime while amending the SEA of
1934 through the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. 912
American legislators believed that a vague warning encom-
passing varying judicial interpretations of Rule 1Ob-5 and 14e
would be a more effective deterrent than an explicit prohibi-
tion-a minefield would be more successful than a road-
block. 30 Now, however, bills before Congress would at last
define insider trading.' 5 ' Similarly Parliament took a harder
125. Ipsen, The Long Shadow of Bob Birnbaum, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1987,
187, 189.
126. Id. at 189.
127. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
129. Pub. L. 98-376, § 2. 98 Stat. 1264, 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2)(a) (Supp. III 1985)).
130. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance of the [House] Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H. R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1983).
131. Sussman, Bill that Defines Insider Trading Emerges in Senate, Wall St. J., June 18,
1987, at 24, col. 3. Oddly enough, the SEC itself has recently reversed its longstand-
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stance on the crime in 1985 when it supplanted its 1981 out-
line of acts which can constitute the crime with a longer and
more comprehensive one.132
One noteworthy difference between the two nations' defi-
nition/concept of insider trading concerns the motive for the
trade: in Britain, an insider dealer must have traded in order
to enjoy a profit or avoid a loss, while in the United States, an
insider trader is one who purchases on the basis of nonpublic
information, for any motive.' 33
Also, amidst the hodgepodge of British procedural law lies
the British Supreme Court Act of 1981,'14 which allows for the
freezing of defendants' wrongfully gained assets through the
use of what was termed at common law the "Mareva Injunc-
tion. ''3 5 Peculiarly, this statute expressly applies to both
Britons and foreigners. 136 By contrast, the British securities
acts mentioned previously are silent on the subject ofjurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals.' 7 This casts doubt upon the abil-
ity of the DTI to apply British securities laws to non-British
investors at the request of American officials.
The MOU's efficacy will ultimately be dependent upon a
British court's application of several statutes to an alleged de-
frauder. It is precisely such reliance on judicial action and sub-
sequent international tensions when the party targeted by the
action is foreign that led to the MOU's drafting.3 8 Therefore,
a better approach to the problem of international regulation is
the formation of an intermarket surveillance system based
upon certain common and codified violations and uniform
penalties that would apply equally to all participating markets.
The New York Stock Exchange and eight other American
exchanges have utilized such a surveillance system since
ing position and asked for a clear definition of insider trading. Robb, SEC, in a Rever-
sal, Offers Definition of Insider Trading, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
132. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, ch. 8.
133. See Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(a) (Supp.
III 1985) and Read, How to Avoid Going Inside, BusINEss, Feb. 1987, at 32, 35.
134. Supreme Court Act 1981, ch. 54.
135. Id. § 37(3).
136. See id.
137. See Contempt of Court Act 1981, ch. 49; Company Securities (Insider Deal-
ing) Act 1985, ch. 8; Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60.
138. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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1985.'1 9 The initial goals of the Intermarket Surveillance
Group ("ISG") were "1) defining which surveillance concerns
were of an intermarket nature; 2) developing a means to review
for their occurrence; and 3) adopting procedures to coordinate
resulting investigations."'' 40  By locating and defining six
fraudulent activities common to all of the participating U.S. ex-
changes,1 4' the ISG hopes to create a more effective audit trail
and therefore be better able to gather evidence necessary for
effective regulation.1 42 The Group reports directly to the SEC
but is still too young to invite useful comment on its successes.
An international surveillance group would face obstacles
to its formation concerning applicable securities and jurisdic-
tional laws. Faced with the reality of a global linking of foreign
securities markets, 43 officials should confront these problems
instead of depending on agreements that speak of mutual ben-
efit but result in unilateral gain. A codification of common vio-
lations and mutually agreed upon penalties may not be the eas-
iest way to address the growing challenge of international se-
curities regulation, but it is surely the way of the future.
CONCLUSION
The Warner decision emphasized the weakness of the "let's
swap files" approach to international securities fraud preven-
tion. As warmly received as the emperor's new clothes, the
Memorandum of Understanding nonetheless is weak because.
officials from one nation can have their sources of information
cut off by the judiciary of the other. This frightening anomaly
is evidenced by Britain's recent according of reporter's privi-
lege to a financial journalist. 44 This privilege does not exist in
139. Intermarket Surveillance Group, Status Report to the SEC for Period Cov-
ering September 1985 to September 1986 (Oct. 5, 1986).
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 1-3.
142. Id. at 1-5.
143. Internationalization has forced exchanges competing globally to alter some
of their ways. For example, in late 1986, the NYSE changed its operating hours to
open one half hour earlier (9:30 A.M.) to decrease British and United States regula-
tion and securities clearing problems. Stock Trading Will Begin Half-Hour Earlier Today,
Wall St.J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 41, col. 1.
As of the completion of this Note, foreign agencies had openly asked the SEC for
help through information on foreign investors. Foreign Pleas for SEC Help, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1987, at D21, col. 4.
144. See High Court Decision, supra note 3.
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the United States when the consequence is the impedence of a
criminal investigation or the preclusion of a civil trial. Addi-
tionally, the MOU is weakened by its reliance upon varying
legal and semantic interpretations and differing notions of the
respect accorded an interim agreement. Officials from both
the U.S. and the U.K. who negotiate the eventual treaty must
eliminate these flaws by providing for the useful sharing of in-
formation through reciprocity provisions. These provisions
should guarantee mutuality of opportunity to obtain evidence
as well as obligation to gather and share it. If this cannot be
accomplished, all agencies involved would be better served by
working to implement an international surveillance system.
Proposing such a solution might at first prove controversial,
but then again, so must have been informing the fabled em-
peror of his lack of attire.
J. Scott Colesanti*
* J.D. candidate, 1988, Fordham University.
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